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AFTERWORD
EXPLORING THE ECONOMIC MEANINGS
OF GENDER
JOAN WILLIAMS*
It is an exciting moment.  Quite suddenly, the issue of care is on
the table.  Joan Tronto, Martha Fineman, Eva Kittay, Mona
Harrington, and Deborah Stone, all are asking how society needs to
change:  first, to make time for the daily work involved in caring for
children and the elderly; second, to make sure that the widespread
devaluation of care work does not impoverish the adults who do it.1
At an important recent conference, a coalition of sociologists,
economists, lawyers, and others began to crystallize around the issue
                                                                
* Professor of Law, American University, Washington College of Law; Co-Director,
Gender, Work & Family Project.  This Afterword is a response to feedback on my
book, both during lectures in other cities and during the conference covered in this
volume.  My deepest thanks to Adrienne Davis, whom it has been my privilege to
work with in founding the Gender, Work & Family Project.  Both Adrienne and
Martha Ertman read the draft of parts of this Essay, and gave me useful guidance and
comments.  To my colleague Jamin Raskin I owe the phrase “economic meanings”;
he talks often of the “economic and other social meanings.”  Brooke Grandle,
Nadine Stocklin, Leticia Vasquez, and Sheryl Kay provided expert research
assistance.
1. See generally MARTHA FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER AND THE SEXUAL FAMILY
231 (1998) [hereinafter SEXUAL FAMILY] (arguing that public policy should shift from
its current focus on the “sexual family” to a new focus on the mother/child dyad as
the solution to the “inevitable dependencies”); MONA HARRINGTON, CARE AND
EQUALITY 44 (1999) (declaring that family care must become recognized as a
“national social value rightfully calling on Americans for meaningful support as a
matter of high priority”); EVA FEDER K ITTAY, LOVE’S LABOR (1999) (arguing that
society must recognize “the indispensable role of dependency workers and the
importance of their participation as full citizens”); JOAN TRONTO, MORAL
BOUNDARIES, A POLITICAL ARGUMENT FOR AN ETHIC OF CARE 161-62 (1994) (placing
care work at the center of political theory and arguing for care as the ethical ideal);
Deborah Stone, Why We Need A Care Movement, THE NATION, Mar. 13, 2000, at 13
(asserting the need for a “care movement” and discussing the needs of informal
caregivers, as well as the “army of underpaid and overworked formal caregivers”).
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of care work.2
This issue reports on a Symposium organized around what I call
“reconstructive feminism,”3 my own contribution to this debate.  It is
a great luxury for any author to be able to invite colleagues she
respects to engage with her work.  I am grateful to a generous dean
who provided the funding, and to the participants for adding another
event to their already busy lives.  In this Essay, I grapple with a few of
the important questions that have been raised in the debates over
care work and reconstructive feminism.
Are social subsidies the answer?
As always, it depends on the question.  Social subsidies, without a
doubt, are sorely needed in the United States to address the
outrageously high levels of childhood poverty.  The poverty rate
among U.S. children is 21.5%, higher than the rates in every
European country except for the poorest (Ireland).4  Poor children
in the United States have a lower real standard of living than in
virtually any other Western country, despite the fact that the United
States has a higher real standard of living than most of the
comparison countries.5
Social subsidies could offer caretakers a basic level of economic
independence, thereby enabling them to support their children
independent of men.  This would mean that we would no longer see
battered women who cannot leave for economic reasons, or men free
to be overbearing in subtler ways because their partners have no
realistic economic alternative but to put up with them.  New social
                                                                
2. See, e.g., Conference on Work & Family:  Expanding the Horizons, The Business
and Women’s Foundation, The Center for Working Families at the University of
California, Berkeley, and the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation, San Francisco, California
(Mar. 3-4, 2000) (addressing issues related to the needs for child care).  The Sloan
Foundation funds five centers that carry out research on working families.  These
include the Employment and Family Careers Institute at Cornell University; the
Center on Parents, Children, and Work at the University of Chicago; the Center on
Working Families at the University of California, Berkeley; the Center for
Ethnography of Everyday Life at the University of Michigan; and the newly funded
Center on Rituals and Myths on Working Families at Emory University.  It has played
a major role in fueling the care movement, through these centers and a listserv run
by Professor Bob Drago of Pennsylvania State University.
3. See JOAN W ILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER:  WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 4-6 (1999) [hereinafter UNBENDING GENDER] (outlining a
“new paradigm” that calls for the elimination of the “ideal-worker norm” in market
work and family entitlements, as well as a proposal for “changing the ways we talk
about gender”).
4. See THEDA SKOCPOL, THE MISSING MIDDLE 105 (2000) (noting that child-
poverty rates are under 10% in all European nations except Ireland, the poorest
European country, which has a 12% child-poverty rate).
5. See id.  The exceptions are Ireland and Israel, where children have lower
standards of living than in the United States.
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subsidies, if and when the political will exists to pass them, would be
an important step in helping many women.  Yet it is important to
consider whether social subsidies, alone, will deliver economic
equality for women.
The Scandinavian experience suggests they will not.  The most
sobering examples are from Norway and Sweden.  Both provide social
subsidies for care work that are generous by world standards,
including parental leave and long periods during which parents are
entitled to work part-time to care for children.6  The result in both
countries is high levels of women working part-time, while men avoid
part-time work because it typically stalls career advancement.7  In
Sweden, the end result is a level of sex segregation even higher than
our own very high rate.8  The Scandinavian experience suggests that
social subsidies, alone, will not deliver economic equality for women.
To deliver equality to women as a group, we need not only to
redefine caretakers’ relationship to public wealth, but also to
redefine their relationship to private wealth.
This redefinition involves the agenda of reconstructive feminism,
                                                                
6. See JUDITH LORBER, PARADOXES OF GENDER 164 (1994) (citing Sweden’s
method of permitting one parent to take parental leave for the first year of their
child’s life, with nine months fully compensated and allowing parents to work part-
time until the child is eight years old); Parental Leave in Europe, 262 EUROPEAN INDUS.
REL. REV. 14, 14-23 (1995) (describing Norway’s system of allowing employees to take
one year’s parental leave paid at a rate of 80% of their earnings for the previous 52
weeks).
7. See Marguerite G. Rosenthal, Sweden:  Promise and Paradox, in THE
FEMINIZATION OF POVERTY:  ONLY IN AMERICA? ch. 6 (Gertrude Schaffner Goldberg &
Eleanor Kremen eds., 1990) (discussing the limits of Sweden’s quest  for gender
equality); Jane Lewis & Gertrude Åström, Equality, Difference, and State Welfare:  Labor
Market And Family Policies in Sweden, 18 FEMINIST STUD. 59, 71 (1992) (stating that in
Sweden “women tend to become part-time workers with the birth of a first child”)
(citing Eva M. Bernhardt, The Choice of Part-Time Work Among Swedish One-Child
Mothers, STOCKHOLM RESEARCH REPORTS IN DEMOGRAPHY no. 40 (1987)); see also Kari
Waerness, Work-Family Relations in Late Modernity:  A Scandinavian Perspective,
Presentation at Conference on Work and Family:  Expanding the Horizons (Mar. 3-4,
2000) (commenting that the ideal worker has been redefined in public sector jobs,
which offer significant job flexibility, in sharp contrast to private sector jobs, a point
confirmed by another conference participant, Elin Krande, of the Norwegian
University of Science and Technology).
8. See Lewis & Åström, supra note 7, at 72 (stating that Sweden has “one of the
most sexually segregated labor markets in the Western world”) (citing Christina
Jonung, Patterns of Occupational Segregation in the Labour Market, in SEX DISCRIMINATION
AND EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES 44-68 (1984)).  Lewis & Åström noted, and Waerness
agreed, that the concentration of women in public sector jobs fuels the high levels of
sex segregation in the Swedish economy.  See Lewis & Åström, supra note 7, at 72.
This phenomenon exists because women in public sector jobs are not penalized for
working part-time and taking advantage of other forms of state-mandated scheduling
flexibility, as are most workers in private sector jobs.  See id. at 75 (describing the time
flexibility accorded mothers in the Swedish public sector).  Evidently, in Scandinavia
as elsewhere, mothers’ career selections are driven as much by job structure as by job
content.
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and requires restructuring both market work and family entitlements.
The fact is that most of the world’s wealth is accessed through paid
employment.  Social subsidies are no substitute for restructuring jobs
so as to make employment equally accessible to men and women.
Nor do social subsidies for caretakers accomplish the goals
achieved by redefining who owns what within the family.  This
emerged in a Law & Society session where one Israeli audience
member observed that, while social subsidies would “of course” exist,
they tend to be too low.9  A 1992 article found that “[w]henever a
state benefit has been offered to women for their work as mothers,
or, more commonly in the 1980s, for their work in caring for elderly
and infirm dependents, the rates have been extremely low.”10
Looking at it another way, U.S. husbands typically earn seventy
percent of the family income.11  This means that, in most families, the
chief family asset is the ideal-worker wage.  Should men be left as sole
owners of that wage?  I would argue they should not, even if mothers
were to receive social subsidies for caretaking.
The ideal-worker wage should be jointly owned because it embeds
not only the ideal worker’s market work but also the family work
performed by the primary caretaker, without which the father could
not perform as an ideal worker.  Even in a society that offered social
subsidies for care work, why should men continue to be defined as
the sole owners of the private wealth produced by the ideal
worker/marginalized caretaker dyad?  Even if women are given a
more equal share of the public wealth, they should be treated as joint
owners of the private wealth produced by the family unit.
In conclusion, subsidies for care work are of vital importance in
attaining economic equality for women, but subsidies must be
complemented by restructuring market work and family entitlements
to change women’s relationship to private wealth.  All three projects
                                                                
9. Restructuring Market Work and Family Entitlements, Law and Society Association
Annual Meeting (May 28, 1999) (quote from audience member). This comment
demonstrates how unusual the United States is in its resistance to social subsidies.
Other data confirms this resistance.  For example, the United States is one of the
very short list of industrialized countries that has no universal health insurance and
no paid parental or maternity leaves.  See J. Kevin Mills, Childcare Leave:  Unequal
Treatment in the European Economic Community, 1992 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 497, 497 (“The
United States thus remains one of the few advanced industrialized nations that has
no national health insurance, no national maternity or parental leave policies, and
no national legislation mandating job-protected leaves at the time of childbirth.”).
10. Lewis & Åström, supra note 7, at 79-80 (reporting the low benefit rates
offered to women for their work as mothers and caretakers for the elderly).
11. UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 60.  See STEPHEN ROSE, ON SHAKY
GROUND:  RISING FEARS ABOUT INCOMES AND EARNINGS (National Comm’n for
Employment Policy, Research Report No. 94-02, 1994).
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are necessary in order to change the economic meanings of gender.
Proportional pay, benefits, and advancement for part-time work:  should
this be a central focus of the effort to restructure market work? What does it
offer to non-affluent women and single mothers?
The most striking aspect of the morning session of the symposium
was its tight focus on the principle of proportional pay, benefits, and
advancement for part-time work.  This was due, in part, to the
presence of many women lawyers in the audience.  Because relatively
few mothers survive the standard legal career path, with its forty years
of mandatory overtime, the economy of mothers and others emerges
with sharp clarity in the legal profession.  Given that ninety-three
percent of mothers12 work less than fifty hours a week during their
key career-building years, non-marginalized part-time tracks clearly
are a pressing issue for women lawyers.13
Yet the claim that nondiscrimination principles require
proportional pay, benefits, and advancement for part-time work has
implications far beyond the legal profession.  Bob Drago, Professor of
Labor Studies at Pennsylvania State University, has challenged me to
consider whether a tight focus on what we can call the principle of
proportionality is appropriate as a more general matter.  In my book
I shied away from an explicit focus on part-time work because of data
indicating that African-American women are less likely than white
women to work part-time,14 and because of data indicating that only
about one in every five employed women work part time in the
United States.15
However, during the final stages of the publication of my book,
Professor Manuelita Ureta kindly offered to re-examine the raw
Census data on women’s work schedules.16  She pointed out that we
need to identify not only those mothers who work part-time but also
                                                                
12. The data refers to mothers aged 25 to 44 with children under 18.  See
UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 2.
13. See id.  For an important study of the ways in which part-time attorneys are
marginalized, see CYNTHIA FUCHS EPSTEIN ET AL., THE PART-TIME PARADOX:  TIME
NORMS, PROFESSIONAL LIFE, FAMILY AND GENDER (1999).
14. See Chris Tilly, Short Hours, Short Shrift:  The Causes and Consequences of Part-
Time Employment, in NEW POLICIES FOR THE PART-TIME CONTINGENT WORKFORCE 15, 18,
tbl. 1 (Virginia L. du Rivage ed., 1992) (citing 1988 U.S. Bureau of Labor statistics
indicating that 27.7% of white women worked part-time, while 20.7% of black
women worked part-time).
15. See Michael Selmi, Family Leave and the Gender Wage Gap, 78 N.C. L. REV. 707,
733 n.95 (2000) (estimating that fewer than 20% of women over age 25 work part-
time).
16. Professor Ureta is Associate Professor of Economics at Texas A & M
University.  She used machine-readable versions of BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S.
DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, PUBLIC USE FILES (Mar. Supp.
1996).  Professor Ureta’s research is hereinafter referred to as Ureta Census Data.
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those who work part year, because some mothers who work full time
do not work year round.  When Professor Ureta ran the numbers, we
found that current data on part-time work seriously underestimate
the extent to which mothers fail to meet the ideal worker norm in
traditionally masculine jobs.  In fact, during the key years of career
building (between the ages of twenty-five and forty-four), nearly forty
percent of mothers do not work forty hours/week year round.17  An
additional twenty-five percent of this group are homemakers.18
In other words, two out of every three mothers do not perform as ideal
workers during the key years of career development, even in the minimal
sense of working year-round forty hours a week.  In addition (as
noted above), only seven percent work substantial overtime.  This
means that most mothers are excluded from desirable blue- and
white-collar jobs that require substantial overtime or a “full-time”
schedule. In this social context, the proposal to guarantee
proportional pay, benefits, and advancement holds tremendous
importance.
It stands to benefit several different groups of women. The first is
homemakers.  Many of the mothers who are at home full-time during
the key years of career advancement might well prefer to be in the
labor force.  Why aren’t they?  Many probably have trouble finding
child care, given the mismatch between the supply and the demand
for child care.19  Others might well want to work, but not for the long
hours currently required of ideal workers.  A track that offered
quality part-time work, thereby reducing the number of hours
required for paid and family work combined, would increase
women’s economic equality by increasing the number of women able
to participate in the labor force.  This would help the economy by
tapping the talents of many trained and productive workers who
currently are frozen out because of a mismatch between their
preferred schedule and what the market has to offer.
A quality part-time track also would benefit women (and men) who
currently work part-time.  Part-time workers today typically pay a
significant price for the “privilege” of working part time:  they
average fifty-eight cents on each dollar earned by full-time workers per
hour worked; are less likely to have health insurance, pensions, and
other job benefits; and frequently are cut off from career
                                                                
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See HELEN BLANK ET AL., CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND, THE SUPPLY OF CHILD
CARE, EARLY EDUCATION, AND SCHOOL-AGE CARE IS INADEQUATE, KEY FACTS:  ESSENTIAL
INFORMATION ABOUT CHILD CARE, EARLY EDUCATION, AND SCHOOL-AGE CARE 55-62
(1999).
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advancement.20 Proportional pay would mean a pay raise for many
part-timers; proportionality would also give them benefits and
promotions for the first time since they went part-time.
A quality part-time track also would benefit many women who
currently work full time. Many mothers who work full time now find
themselves on mommy tracks because of their inability to work
overtime.  Given that many of the best blue- and white-collar jobs
require large amounts of mandatory overtime, the principle of
proportionality would open up many of the economy’s best jobs to
women.  This includes not only jobs in upper-level management (still
more than ninety-five percent white men) but high-quality blue-collar
jobs as well.21  Those jobs, which have the highest concentration of
white men of any job category,22 now often require so much overtime
that some unions have begun to change their traditional embrace of
overtime and to oppose mandatory overtime as a key bargaining
demand in contract negotiations.23
In addition, the principle of proportionality could help reverse the
growing “time divide” among American workers.  According to Bob
Drago, “A consistent body of research demonstrates that U.S.
employees are increasingly split into those working very short or very
long hours.”24  This time divide is a gendered one:  women are twice
as likely as men to work part time and men are nearly three times as
likely as women to work overtime.25  Drago’s data also show that the
length of men’s workday has increased much more sharply than
women’s.26  Assuming that men who work long hours of overtime are
less likely to share equally in household work (not an implausible
assumption), the time divide has important implications for gender
equality.27
                                                                
20. See Chris Tilly, Reasons for the Continuing Growth of Part-Time Employment, 114
MONTHLY LAB. REV. 12 (1991) (noting that “part-time workers are much less likely to
receive most major fringe benefits” than full-time workers; while only one in twenty
full-time workers earned the minimum wage in 1984, over one-fourth of part-time
workers did.  In 1989, the median part-time wage translated into 58% of the median
full-timer’s hourly wage).
21. See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 67.
22. See id. at 76
23. See id. at 80; Remarks by Morty Bahr, President, Communications Workers of
America, at the Industrial Relations Research Association Conference (June 22-23,
2000) (noting that the large amounts of overtime required of communications
workers is a problem; if a family has to rely on large amounts of overtime to get by,
“there’s something wrong”).
24. BOB DRAGO, TRENDS IN WORKING T IME IN THE U.S.:  A POLICY PERSPECTIVE 6
(June 2000) [hereinafter Drago Inventory Paper] (Inventory Paper for the Sloan
Work/Family Policy Network) (on file with author).
25. Id.
26. Id. at tbl. 1.
27. The allocation of overtime also has important race and class implications.
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It is also important to assess whether proportionality would offer
benefits to single mothers as well as married ones.  In this context,
the most important point is that, while fewer single than married
mothers work part-time, almost as low a percentage of single as
married mothers work substantial overtime:28 roughly ninety percent
of single mothers work less than fifty hours a week.29  Thus to the
(significant) extent that single mothers’ marginalization stems from
their inability to work overtime, proportionality offers significant
advantages.
Proportionality would help single mothers in an additional way as
well.  To the extent that inability to work “full time” and overtime
currently excludes mothers from traditionally masculine jobs,
proportionality would help open up reduced hours tracks in
traditionally masculine jobs for the first time.  The resulting climate
in such jobs would benefit non-mothers as well as mothers.  Data
from cognitive bias psychology show that women suffer a
disadvantage when only a few try to make it in traditionally male
workplaces where women are rare.  If more mothers entered such
workplaces, the number of women would rise, a development that
would help all women, whether or not they have children.30
In addition to helping women in general, mothers with different
work schedules, and single as well as married mothers,
proportionality also has the potential to help women of different
income groups.  It could help very low-income mothers in two
different ways.  First, when these women are forced into the labor
force by welfare “reform,” part-time jobs are often all they can find.
As a consequence, low-income women find they earn
disproportionately low wages, lack benefits, and are precluded from
career tracks that lead to management positions.  The principle of
                                                                
Drago’s data show that the average number of hours has fallen for the lowest two
deciles of women and has not risen for the lowest three quartiles of men, but has
risen sharply for higher-income workers, with the rises sharpest among the most
privileged workers.  Id.
28. While single mothers are less likely than married ones to work part time, 11%
of divorced mothers and 15% of never-married mothers work less than 35
hours/week.  Ureta Census Data, supra note 16 (calculations based on Table 8,
“Employment Status of Persons by Presence and Age of Children, Sex, Race,
Hispanic Origin, and Marital Status, Annual Averages 1999 (based on the Current
Population Survey)”).
29. See id. (90.07% of single mothers work less than 50 hours/week).
30. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of Our Categories:  A Cognitive Bias
Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1161,
1193-94 (1995) (discussing social cognition experiments which revealed that
evaluators favored minority applications who were “superstars” over identical
majority applicants, but viewed other minority applicants more harshly than identical
majority applicants).
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proportionality would improve their earning power and their
benefits, and would open up advancement opportunities as well.31
Proportionality has the potential to help working-class women as
well as poor ones. The best jobs available for women with a high
school education typically are blue-collar jobs.  As I noted in
Unbending Gender, such jobs often exclude women through two types
of masculine norms.32  First, they design work around men’s bodies,
either by designing equipment in ways that exclude large proportions
of women (and Asian-American men).33  Second, good blue-collar
jobs (like good white-collar ones) often are designed around men’s
relative immunity from child care.34  Hence they require employees to
work large amounts of overtime, or to attend apprenticeship or other
training programs that occur after work hours, in order to qualify for
the jobs or for promotions.  Both the overtime requirements and the
fact that virtually no good blue-collar jobs offer part-time tracks
contribute to the absence of women in such jobs.  A track that
offered proportional pay, benefits, and advancement could play a
significant role in opening up those jobs to women.
Proportionality also holds advantages for women in elite
professional and managerial jobs.  In those jobs, the “executive
schedule” plays the central role by precluding most mothers from
high-level jobs, which typically require substantial overtime.  Where
“flexibility” and part-time work are available, typically they are linked
with marginalization and the mommy track.35
This analysis shows that a non-marginalized part-time track would
help many different groups of women.  Proportionality also would
create more options for men.  To demonstrate how men would
benefit from the restructuring of part-time work, let me start with a
few anecdotes.
Take the new father who used his sabbatical year to be the primary
caretaker of his daughter.  Or the father who left work religiously at
5:30 p.m. every day, even when he was under tremendous time
pressure as an associate dean.  Or the father who proudly brings his
children to work on snow days when his wife has to work.
An important point is that all of these men are tenured law
                                                                
31. Interview with Joyce S. Agunbiade, Ph.D., Executive Director, Life Pathways,
Inc. and Board Member, National Council on Family Care (May 5, 2000).  Life
Pathways is an organization that works with Welfare-to-Work mothers.
32. Sexual harassment also plays an important role in policing women out of
good blue-collar jobs.  See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 77-79.
33. See id. at 76-77.
34. Id. at 79-81.
35. Id. at 66-76.
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professors.  What they already have is what I am trying to give other
men (as well as women): flexible work arrangements that do not
preclude career advancement.  For if you ask not who is willing to
leave at 5:30 p.m. as an associate dean, but who is willing to leave
early when that results in denial of tenure, you will find many women,
but few men.
This is because we still “measure masculinity by the size of a
paycheck.”36  Work success, as defined in terms of wages earned,
continues as the central thread of identity for all but very
unconventional men.  Thus, most men will not pay the price for
primary caretaking that mothers have traditionally paid, that is,
permanent economic vulnerability.
Many men have no desire to live “a gray life at hard labor,”37 or to
repeat childhoods in which they rarely saw their fathers.  One 1998
poll found that forty-four percent of the men surveyed would choose
to reduce their hours (with a proportionate decrease in pay) if their
employers allowed them to do so.38  Bob Drago’s research suggests
that men have a greater mismatch between their preferred and their
actual hours than women do.39  If men don’t want to work such long
hours, why do they continue to do so?  Often the alternative is a
career wipe-out few men can afford, both for psychological reasons
relating to the linkage of masculine identity and work roles,40 and for
economic ones in a society where the typical father still earns seventy
percent of the family income.41
Many men who are unwilling to “wipe out” would be willing to slow
down their careers, so long as they can remain in a steady (if slower)
career progression.  This is particularly true, I suspect, because the
mere existence of non-marginalized part-time tracks would change
pre-marital bargaining in significant ways.
Today, the only thing a young women can do is to ask her intended
whether he will share equally once children are born.  In era when
the gap between “the talk” and “the walk” is often a wide one,
                                                                
36. See Robert E. Gould, Measuring Masculinity by the Size of a Paycheck, in MEN AND
MASCULINITY 96 (Joseph H. Pleck & Jack Sawyer eds., 1974) (noting that our culture
equates money with success and similarly, man’s worth or masculinity is measured by
his money).
37. See JULIET SCHOR, THE OVERWORKED AMERICAN 43 (1991) (arguing that
capitalism created incentives for employers to require long hours).
38. See Karl E. Reichardt & David Schroeder, $alarie$ 1998, 79 STRATEGIC FIN. 26
(1998).
39. See Drago Inventory Paper, supra note 24, at 8.
40. See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 25-27 (discussing the association
between masculinity and “breadwinning”).
41. See id. at 60.
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intentions are often not an accurate predictor of what will actually
happen.  But imagine if a young woman could ask a follow-up
question:  does that mean we both will work thirty-five hours a week
for a significant period after we have children?  Even if the answer
were no, she would have had the advantage of truth in packaging,
and that is worth a lot.
The results of this change in marital (and pre-marital) bargaining
might well be more men working nonstandard schedules and a
gradual weakening of the linkage between caretaking and femininity.
Cultural space would open up for a new definition of caretaking as
manly.42
If nurturance were redefined as manly and were not so closely
associated with economic vulnerability, the devaluation of family
work might well begin to shift.  In my view, this is a much more
effective strategy for reversing the current devaluation of care work
than an approach that depends solely on exhortation and jawboning.
Feminists have been arguing for twenty years or more that we need to
increase the value we give to unpaid care work.  Jawboning has not
proved very effective.  What we need is to change the material
consequences of care work by changing our system of providing for
children’s care by economically marginalizing those who care for
them.  While symbolic valuation is important, it tends to follow
material consequences.
An additional important question is whether people could afford
to work only part-time.  Keep in mind, first, that “part-time” in a
mandatory overtime environment may well mean a forty-hour week
(which is the official definition of part-time in many Washington law
firms).  In other contexts, the net result of non-marginalized part-
time tracks would be not a lower overall family income, but a
reallocation of that income between husband and wife (or ex-wife).
Recall that the average American father still earns seventy percent of
the family income, while the average mother earns only thirty
percent.43  If workers were offered proportionality, the work hours
(and the incomes) of mothers and fathers might tend equalize.  This
not only would increase women’s bargaining power within marriage.
                                                                
42. I am thinking here of a Norwegian advertisement that shows the government
minister in charge of implementing the family leave policy, bare from the waist up
and hairy chested, holding up a baby in each muscled arm. See Larry May & Robert
Strikwerd, Rethinking Masculinity:  Philosophical Explorations in Light of Feminism, in
FATHERHOOD AND NURTURANCE 90 (1992) (discussing an “ideal characterization of
fatherhood in terms of nurturance” which corresponds to the experiences many
contemporary fathers are having or at least would aspire to).
43. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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It would also help protect women and children from impoverishment
in the event of divorce.
A final consideration concerns the impact of proportionality on a
particularly vulnerable group of women:  professional child care
workers.  The depressed wage rates of child care providers no doubt
reflect racism and the gendered devaluation of care work.  But they
also reflect a pass-through of exploitation.  Remember that (although
women without children earn roughly ninety percent of men’s wages)
mothers earn only sixty percent of the wages of fathers,44 and the gap
between the wages of mothers and others has actually widened in
recent years.45  The low wages of mothers are important because the
accepted calculation is to measure whether “it is worth it for mom to
work” by measuring the amount the mother earns against the amount
the family has to pay for child care.46  Given this calculation, an end
to mothers’ economic marginalization could be expected to raise the
wages of child care workers.
Proportionality could be expected to raise child care workers’
salaries for another reason. Today, women who work full-time are
much more likely to use childcare by nonfamily members.47  Such
women often feel they cannot afford high rates for child care because
they need so much of it—coverage for at least forty-five hours a week
(a forty-hour week, plus the average one-hour commute).48  However,
if parents could work fewer hours with only a proportional decrease
in pay, benefits, and advancement, more couples could be expected
to work staggered, reduced time schedules.  For example, each
parent could work four days a week and have their infant in child
care only twenty-seven hours a week.49  Parents with school-age
children could each work a thirty-five-hour week and still be available
                                                                
44. See Jane Waldfogel, The Family Gap for Young Women in the U.S. and Britain, 16
J. LABOR ECON. 505, 507 (1998) (noting a report citing statistics from the late 1980s
discussing the wage gap affecting women in both the United States and United
Kingdom).
45. See id. (quoted in UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 2 (stating that
“[h]aving children has a very strong negative effect on women’s income”)).
46. Note that this calculation embeds the assumption that child care is the
mother’s responsibility, although in fact the family needs child care equally as much
because the father is employed, as it does because the mother is employed.
47. See Joan Williams, Revised Memo for the Sloan Work/Family Policy Network:  Who is
Caring for America’s Children? 9 (June 4, 2000) (on file with author) [hereinafter
Network Memo] (mothers who work part-time much more likely to use only family
members or relatives for child care).
48. See Joan Williams, Gender Wars:  Selfless Women in the Republic of Choice, 66
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1597 (1996) (noting that the average worker’s commute is one
hour).
49. Each parent would care for the child for one weekday (eight hours/day plus
a one hour commute = nine hours/day).  The family would need child care for only
three days/week:  nine hours/day for three days/week = twenty-seven hours/week.
AFTERWORDPP.DOC 6/18/2001  12:17 PM
2000] AFTERWORD 999
to pick up the kids from school a day or two each week, to take them
to the lessons and play dates that have become increasingly important
in middle class childrearing.50  The net result of these changes in
work schedule would be that many families would need much less
than forty-five hours/week of child care.51  As a result, they might well
find it economically feasible to pay more per hour of care.
This brings us back to our initial question:  is a tight focus
appropriate on proportional pay, benefits, and advancement for
reduced-hours work? A signal advantage of proportionality is that it is
immediately imageable, a very important consideration when dealing
with the public and the mainstream press.  I recall walking out of a
television studio in Denver, having just done a spot for the local news.
The policeman in the front lobby, with whom I had chatted as I
entered, hailed me as I left.  “You were great,” he said.  “My wife has
been home with the kids, but now they’re older so she’s starting to
look for work.  Your idea of proportional pay, benefits, and
advancement makes a lot of sense.  I’m going to buy her your book.”52
All that said, it is important to point out that the agenda of
reconstructive feminism is much broader than that defined by the
principle of proportionality.  Proportionality is important, but not all
encompassing.  For example, telecommuting is another important
tool in restructuring work.  Take Denver executive Jim Johnson, who
offered telecommuting as well as proportional benefits for part-time
workers to the employees of his moving company as the result of a
lecture I gave last year.  Not only the benefits, but also the
telecommuting, made a tremendous difference in the lives of his
workers, according to an article in the Denver Post.
Johnson’s employees were ‘absolutely thrilled’ with the chance
to stay home and work flexible hours, says Lori Spurr, the
company’s executive vice president and a mom who routinely
works from her home office on Fridays.
‘They were just giddy when Jim Johnson went around to tell
them what was coming,” Spur says.
‘It makes you feel really secure in your knowledge that the
                                                                
50. “Lessons” are one of the primary child care arrangements for children five to
thirteen.  See Network Memo, supra note 47, at 5 (citing SANDRA L. HOFFERTH ET AL.,
THE NATIONAL CHILD CARE SURVEY, tbls. 2.15, 2.20 (1990) [hereinafter NCCS]).
51. For example, one parent had a fifteen-minute commute each way and
worked fifteen minutes from their children’s school.  S/he could work thirty-five
hours/week and still pick up the children two days a week.  If the other parent
worked farther away, s/he could still pick up the children from school one day and
work a thirty-five-hour week.
52. 9 News at 4 (KUSA-TV (Denver) television broadcast, Jan. 14, 2000).  I have
paraphrased; I did not note down the policeman’s actual wording.
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company does understand you have a personal life, and that they
also understand that your family has to be your priority.’
“He’s pro-rating benefits?  Wow,” she [Laura Asher of the
National Partnership for Women and Families] said when she
heard about Johnson.  “It’s happening a little more, but it’s still
unusual.”53
Absenteeism and sick leave policies are other areas that are
important when the goal is to restructure paid work.  Each year, many
women, particularly low-income ones, are fired due to absenteeism
when their child care fell through, or when a child was ill.54
Workplace policies that preclude workers from using their sick leave
to care for ill dependents can be shown, in many workplaces, to have
a disproportionate impact on women, as can rigid absenteeism
policies.  Other common policies with a disproportionate impact on
women are pension policies that give credit for time taken off for
military duty but not time taken off for childrearing; factories where
on-the-job training programs occur at night; apprenticeship
programs that require the apprentice to work all day and then attend
classes at night. They also include insurance company rules that bar
health insurance and other benefits for those who work part-time, as
Jim Johnson discovered when he tried to offer benefits for workers
who worked less than twenty hours a week.55  The list goes on and on.
Although the principle of proportionality is important, it does not
exhaust the ways that paid work needs to be restructured.
Reconstructive feminism also calls for a redesign of government
benefits linked with paid work.  The design of such benefits also
disproportionally excludes women.  These include unemployment
policies that disqualify workers who are available only for part-time
work, anti-discrimination laws, unemployment laws, occupational
health and safety laws, the federal plant closing act, as well as
Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), and the
Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).56
In conclusion, the principle of proportional pay, benefits, and
                                                                
53. See Claire Martin, Work at Home?, DENVER POST, Feb. 13, 2000, at E7.  The
employees affected include the customer service and accounting departments.
54. See RANDY ALBELDA & CAROL COSENZA, CHOICES AND TRADEOFFS:  THE PARENT
SURVEY ON CHILD CARE IN MASSACHUSETTS 12 (2000) [hereinafter CHOICES & TRADE-
OFFS] (low-income parents more likely than higher-income ones to be fired or forced
to quit because of child care programs).
55. See Martin, supra note 53, at E7 (describing Johnson’s unusual practice of
offering benefits to part-time workers).
56. See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 110-13 (discussing the application of
laws and government benefits to women that were created at a time when it was
assumed that women did not work outside the home).
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advancement for part-time work is an important one.  Perhaps, as
Heidi Hartman suggested,57 we should work towards three tracks, a
twenty-five-hour track, a forty-hour track, and a mandatory overtime
track.  But while proportionality is important, it does not exhaust the
ways we need to restructure paid work and the benefits linked to it.
What does reconstructive feminism offer to less affluent women?
Domesticity began as a gender system that was both raced and
classed.  Having an “angel in the home” was a key marker of middle-
class status.58  Historically, domesticity helped to form and express
race as well as class identity.  It served not only to define middle-class
women’s place in the class hierarchy; it also defined white women’s
place in the racial hierarchy.  Domesticity was understood by whites
as applying only to white women.  Black women were not seen as
Moral Mothers; they were expected to work outside the home.59  A
key question is whether we can redeem this questionable pedigree.
A central argument of Unbending Gender is that domesticity persists
as part of our habitus, as “embodied history, internalized as second
nature, and so forgotten as history.”60  If domesticity persists as a racist
and classist heritage that still operates beneath our level of
consciousness, the only question is whether domesticity will only be
used against progressive goals, or whether it will be used for them as
well.  I argue for strategic uses of “domesticity in drag” to support
progressive agendas.
A central question is whether we can democratize access to
domesticity.  If we truly value children, goes the argument, we should
be willing to restructure work around the values people hold in
family life, namely the norm of parental care.  Reconstructive
feminism claims for all workers, not just privileged ones, the time and
flexibility they need for family care.
In a culture with few languages of solidarity, domesticity is an
important cultural resource.  My book documents that some unions
have used rhetoric that frames demands for increased government
programs in terms tied to children’s welfare.61  So have some
influential academics.  For example, Martha Fineman has argued for
a new universalist social program modeled on Social Security to
support all those charged with dependent care.62  Barbara Bergman,
                                                                
57. See supra transcript of Panel 1:  Redesigning Work and the Benefits Related
To It (comments of Heidi Hartman).
58. See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 34-37.
59. See id. at 164-68.
60. See id. at 38 (quoting Bourdieu).
61. See id. at 201.
62. See SEXUAL FAMILY, supra note 1, at 231; Conversation with Martha Fineman
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too, has argued for huge new social subsidies, linked with the needs
of children.63  In a culture with few viable languages of social
democracy, domesticity has important redistributive potential.
Reconstructive feminism also proposes to shift the focus of
feminism away from the full-commodification model, which
enshrined an ideal of having women perform as ideal workers along
with the men while child care is delegated to market providers.64
Originally this vision included an assumption that child care centers
would be as common, and as free, as public libraries, but significant
government subsidies for child care have not been forthcoming.  As a
result, full-commodification feminism has held little appeal for
impoverished women.  To them, the market looks like a hostile place
to seek child care for both obvious reasons and more subtle ones.
The obvious reason is that “you get what you pay for” and poor
women cannot afford to pay much.  More subtle is that almost half of
poor working parents work rotating or changing schedules, and this
often makes market child care infeasible.65
In addition, when Lucie White talked with low-income mothers in
Boston, she found “a strong ambivalence about placing their children
in day care centers.”66
Many of these women linked day care centers with other
institutions, like schools, subsidized housing, health services, and
welfare offices, in which they felt disrespected and powerless.  They
resented the routinized, impersonal, or rude treatment they often
received in these settings.  In contrast, they regarded their status
and role as mothers as one of their few sources of societal respect
and personal efficiency.  They described their role as mothers as
their central moral anchor in very precarious lives.  It gave them a
sense of identity and a sense of status in their communities.
Therefore, they wanted a say in the care of their children when
they were at work.  They wanted their caretaker’s language and
values to mirror their own.  And they also wanted a personal
relationship with the caregiver, as well as the power and
                                                                
(Oct. 19, 1999).
63. BARBARA R. BERGMAN, SAVING OUR CHILDREN FROM POVERTY 18 (1996) (“A
differently structured and considerably more expensive set of new programs would
be necessary if the United States were to provide a decent standard of living for all
American children.”).
64. See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at Chapter 2 (describing and critiquing
full-commodification feminism).
65. See Network Memo, supra note 47, at 8 (citing CHOICES & TRADEOFFS, supra note
54).
66. Lucie White, Quality Child Care for Low-Income Families:  Despair, Impasse,
Improvisation, in HARD LABOR:  WOMEN AND WORK IN THE POST-WELFARE ERA 116 (Joel
F. Handler & Lucie White eds., 1999).
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opportunity to supervise what the caregiver did with their child.67
White acknowledges that, at some day care centers, excellent and
respectful teachers may offer multicultural curricula and strong
parental involvement.  “Even if they have heard about such programs,
the argument goes, low-income parents may doubt that this kind of
care would ever be made available to them.”68
Available evidence shows that less affluent parents are much more
likely to rely on care by family members than are more affluent
parents.69 Low-income families are much less likely to pay for care
than other families are, even though their use of child care is high.70
Low-income parents are considerably less likely than affluent parents
to use day care centers; they also are much less likely to use extended
day programs.71  Instead, less affluent parents are much more likely to
have their young children cared for by parents and relatives.  This
makes sense, as I pointed out in my book, because family-based
arrangements protect the children of less affluent families from
having their class disenfranchisement translate into lower-quality
market child care.  In this context, the traditional feminist focus on
day care centers seems mismatched with the types of arrangements
less affluent parents prefer in an environment tragically devoid of
social subsidies for child care.  Lucie White has echoed these
concerns:
Perhaps a policy vision that would replace the unpaid care work of
mothers with a universal scheme of professionalized, commodified
care services is itself flawed.  If we are either unable or unprepared,
as a society, to bear the full cost of monetizing and
professionalizing child care for every child, at a level of quality that
would ensure real communication and power-sharing between
parents and caregivers, then perhaps it is best to rethink the
problem from the outset.  Otherwise, there is a great risk that the
consensus model will never be funded and implemented in ways
that reach the poorest families, and a conspiracy of wishful
thinking and silence will preclude us from designing second best,
but feasible, strategies to full the vacuum that results.72
White calls for child care advocates to abandon the
professionalized, center-based model that is the current goal of most
child care advocates, in favor of a model that has two basic thrusts.
                                                                
67. Id. at 128-29.
68. Id. at 129.
69. See Network Memo, supra note 47, at 9 (citing NCCS, supra note 50, tbls. 2.15,
2.20).
70. See id. at 10 (citing CHOICES AND TRADEOFFS, supra note 54, at 11).
71. See id. (citing NCCS, supra note 50, tbls. 2.15 & 2.20).
72. White, supra note 66, at 129-30.
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The first would “enable parents to care for their own children,
particularly infants, in arrangements that do not reinforce the
isolation and gender-inequity of the family wage arrangement.”73  The
second would
move beyond rigid, professionally oriented approaches to ensuring
quality child care to more flexible, network-oriented
approaches. . . .A network of small child-care facilities within a
single neighborhood could be established, supported, and linked
together by a community-based development corporation. . .that
would train, place, and supervise a range of different sources of
labor for the entire network, including volunteer labor from youth,
elders, and student apprentices within the community; community
service volunteers from other, more affluent communities;
and. . . paraprofessionals.74
 White also proposes coalitions that pull together all of the groups
with an interest in quality child care, including employers and
churches.75
White shows the need for a language that states that all children,
not just affluent ones, are entitled to care from their parents.  She
also shows how the current cultural climate surrounding issues of
care work—the ideological system I have called domesticity—places
American feminists under such severe constraints that they need to
consider “second best, but feasible, strategies.”
Reconstructive feminism shares this pragmatic approach, though
White focuses on child care whereas my focus is on restructuring
work to give parents time to play a role in their children’s care.
Parental care today among many poor and working people means
that parents work staggered shifts, for example with one parent
working nights while the other works days.  This arrangement (used
by many working-class families) often takes a tremendous toll on
family life, because the parents rarely see each other.76  Many families
who cannot afford to have one parent work part-time under the
current punitive arrangements would be able to afford to have both
parents shave off a few hours (to enable them to spend some time
together or to get more sleep) if a reduced hours arrangement did
not consign them to a depressed pay rate with no benefits or
advancement, which is today the current price tag of “part-time”
work.
                                                                
73. Id. at 138.
74. Id. at 139.
75. See id. at 139-40.
76. See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 155.
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In addition, reconstructive feminism’s deconstruction of
domesticity offers several additional weapons for advocates of the very
poor.  After all, poor women suffer most from domesticity’s system of
delivering child services through moms in cars.  Poor moms don’t
have cars, so they now have the privilege of taking three buses in the
middle of the night to take their asthmatic child to the hospital—and
then being told they are lazy.77
The charge that poor mothers are “lazy” illustrates the particularly
harsh effects on poor women of domesticity’s erasure of care work.
Although poor women’s family work is erased along with the work of
everyone else, the consequences for poor women are particularly
severe.  As many commentators have pointed out, privileged women
are complimented for “choosing” to stay at home at the same time
that poor women are berated for staying home and “doing nothing.”
This is a very literal erasure of the child care and housekeeping work
poor women perform under very adverse and time-consuming
circumstances.  The erasure of family work may deprive privileged
women of their careers, but its effects on poor women are more
acute.  They are pushed into the labor force with no attention to the
fact that this often forces them to entrust their children to low-quality
child care. Poor women who are child care providers are also
disadvantaged because domesticity’s coding of care work as not “real”
work justifies the dismally low wages paid to child care providers (who
are paid less than garbage collectors).78
A welfare researcher in Wisconsin, Professor Maria Cancian of the
University of Wisconsin, has pointed out that my deconstruction of
domesticity can help advocates for poor women in another way.  The
welfare “reform” debate in Wisconsin, she noted, has tended to
assume only two alternatives—either that poor women perform as
ideal workers, or that they “stay home.”79 Reconstructive feminism
deconstructs the either/or distinction between being “at home” or
“working.”  To the extent that it is no longer politically feasible for
poor women to stay at home full time, reconstructive feminism opens
up the possibility that being “at work” for welfare mothers should
mean part-time work because most primary caretakers (particularly of
                                                                
77. See supra transcript of Panel 3:  New Directions in Feminist Legal Theory
(comments of Lucie White).
78. See GINA C. ADAMS & NICOLE OXENDINE POERSCH, CHILDREN’S DEFENSE FUND,
KEY FACTS ABOUT CHILD CARE AND EARLY EDUCATION:  A BRIEFING BOOK A1-A5 (1997).
79. Professor Maria Cancian is an Associate Professor of Public Affairs and Social
Work at the Robert M. La Folette Institute of Public Affairs at the University of
Wisconsin–Madison.  Her comments were made during a Master Class taught by Joan
Williams at the University of Wisconsin Law School, Madison, January 28, 2000.
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young children) do not work forty hours a week year round.80
Professor Lisa Disch of the University of Minnesota has urged me
to apply ideal worker analysis to the welfare debate by carrying it one
step further.  She questions the basic assumption driving the welfare
debate, namely that women on welfare can pull themselves and their
families out of poverty by getting a job.  This argument, she points
out, rests on the assumption that the jobs available to such women
are those available to white, male ideal workers.  In fact, they are not.
Nearly half (44%) of all women earners have salaries so low that they
cannot raise a family of three above the poverty line.81  The ideal-
worker norm is not only gendered; it also is covertly racialized and
classed.  For even if Welfare-to-Work mothers were to get the kinds of
jobs that are available to their male partners, most still would not
escape from poverty.82  An analysis of the ideal worker as gendered,
classed, and raced shows that the attempt to end poverty by forcing
mothers into the labor market is doomed to failure.83
In short, reconstructive feminism has the potential to help poor
women in several different ways:  by reversing the erasure of their
household work; by establishing for their children an entitlement for
family care; by teasing out the hidden race and class dimension
behind the assumption that full-time work yields a stable family
income; and by questioning the assumption that mothers “ordinarily”
work full time.  In these ways the agenda of reconstructive feminism
has the potential to help poor and working-class women as well as
richer ones.
Note that I have added working-class women back into the
discussion.  As Theda Skocpol has persuasively argued, progressives
have given brilliant attention to the very poor, but in recent years
they have often overlooked the “missing middle,” the ordinary
working-class people without whom no lasting political coalition can
                                                                
80. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
81. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS & BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1998 ANNUAL
DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY MARCH SUPPLEMENT (1998), available at http://www.bls.
census.gov/cps/ads/1998/sdata.htm.  Grateful thanks to Randy Albelda for help in
generating this figure.
82. See JOHN M. MARTINEZ & CYNTHIA MILLER, MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION
RESEARCH CORPORATION, WORKING AND EARNING:  THE IMPACT OF PARENTS’ FAIR SHARE
ON LOW-INCOME FATHERS’ EMPLOYMENT 9 (2000) (showing that the average earnings
of the male partners of Welfare-to-Work mothers was $8,204 per year), available at
http://www.mdrc.org/Reports2000/Parents’FairShare/PFSWorking&Earnings.pdf.
This yearly wage falls well below the Department of Health and Human Services
Poverty Guidelines threshold of $14,150 for a family of three.  Annual Update of the
HHS Poverty Guidelines, 65 Fed. Reg. 7,555, 7,555 (Feb. 15, 2000).
83. See Letter from Lisa Disch, Professor, University of Minnesota, to Joan
Williams (Feb. 9, 2000) (on file with author).
AFTERWORDPP.DOC 6/18/2001  12:17 PM
2000] AFTERWORD 1007
be sustained.84
Feminists, like many others, have sometimes missed the middle.  In
my book, I made a concerted attempt to create a coalition that would
bind working-class women with more privileged ones—a broad
coalition in a country where roughly eighty-five percent of the
population is poor.85  Marion Crain’s moving comments about her
grandmother dramatize the importance of bringing working-class
voices more towards the center of the feminist imagination.86
Growing evidence suggests that work/family issues are important to
union members, many of whom are not privileged people.  Unions
have bargained for, and gained, rights to classic work/life policies
such as the right to work part time after the birth of a child (No.
California Newspaper Guild Local 52 and International Brotherhood
of Electrical Workers Local 1245), flextime (Communications
Workers of America), the right to telecommute (Service Employees
International Union (SEIU)),  job sharing (American Federation of
State, County & Municipal Employees), compressed work weeks
(International Brotherhood of Teamsters Local 830), making all
overtime voluntary as opposed to mandatory (Washington-Baltimore
Newspaper Guild Local 35), and voluntary reduced time (SEIU Local
715, Office and Professional Employees International Union Local
3).  In addition, many unions have taken a leading role in ensuring
that workers can exercise their rights under the Family and Medical
Leave Act, which include the right to take time off to care for a
newborn or newly adopted child, or to care for the worker’s parents
or children when they are ill.  These include the United Steelworkers
of America Local 12075, the American Federation of Musicians Local
6, American Federation of State, County & Municipal Employees
Local 11, the Hotel Employees and Restaurant Employees Locals 2
and 2850, SEIU Locals 535 and 1877, Public Employees Local One,
United Auto Workers Local 2324, and American Federation of
Teachers.  The New York State Nurses Association and the St. Luke’s
Roosevelt Hospital Center obtained the right to have workers donate
their leave to a leave bank or to another employee who has used up
all of her own leave, so that employees can help out a co-worker with
unexpected illness of themselves or their dependents.  Other unions
have gained for workers the right to use their own sick leave to care
                                                                
84. See generally SKOCPOL, supra note 4.
85. See BUREAU OF CENSUS, DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY,
POVERTY STATISTICS (1998) (showing poverty rate of 12.7% for the United States in
1998).
86. See supra transcript of Panel 2:  Who’s Minding the Baby? (comments of
Marion Crain).
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for sick family members.  These examples illustrate that work/life
concerns have appeal among a wide range of workers (despite
unions’ traditional reluctance to push these issues).87
In conclusion, reconstructive feminism’s deconstruction of
domesticity, and its focus on work/family issues, has much to offer to
less affluent women.  To build effective coalitions, we must remember
the middle, but we must do so without forgetting the most
disadvantaged women in one of the most unequal industrialized
societies in the world.88
Does reconstructive feminism merely serve to reinforce the heterosexual
family?
The most direct answer is that, by dismantling the system of
providing for children’s care by marginalizing their caregivers,
reconstructive feminism would significantly reshape the economic
forces that now make it difficult for mothers to assess their sexual
orientation in an honest way.
Domesticity is a gender system that enhances men’s economic
power through a two-step process.  First, the ideal worker norm
establishes men’s bodies and life patterns as the gold standard in
market work, systematically enhancing the economic position of
fathers while undermining the economic position of mothers.
Second, the “he who earns it, owns it” rule fosters mothers’ economic
marginalization and vulnerability.  According to this rule, if a couple
divorces, the husband is treated as the sole owner of the ideal worker
wage.  However, the ideal worker wage encompasses not only the
ideal worker’s market work, but also the flow of family work from the
marginalized caregiver, which allows the husband to perform as an
ideal worker while his children are raised in accordance with the
norm of parental care. If the joint work of two family members
produces an asset, it makes no sense to award its ownership
unilaterally to only one of them.
Reconstructive feminism seeks to dismantle both the ideal worker
norm in market work, and the “he who earns it, owns it” rule that
impoverishes mothers upon divorce and erodes their bargaining
                                                                
87. All data in this paragraph are drawn from LEA GRUNDY ET AL., LABOR’S ROLE
IN ADDRESSING THE CHILD CARE CRISIS (Dec. 1999) (Foundation for Child
Development Working Paper Series) (on file with author).
88. See ROLF AABERGE ET AL., STOCKHOLM SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS:  SSE/EFI
WORKING PAPER SERIES, IN 98 ECONOMICS AND FINANCE:  INCOME INEQUALITY AND
INCOME MOBILITY IN THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES COMPARED TO THE UNITED STATES 1
(1996) (noting that the United States is one of the countries with the highest income
inequality).
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power during marriage.89  The result would be to sharply decrease the
economic considerations that fuel compulsory heterosexuality.
Today, the institution of motherhood, framed by the ideal-worker
norm and the “he who earns it” rule, leaves most mothers with few
real choices.
To support their children with some degree of economic security,
which most mothers feel is the prerequisite to giving children the
education and opportunities they need for a good start in life, most
mothers need a man.  Here’s some data.  The average middle class
woman has the earning power of a working class woman.90  Nearly
forty percent of mothers end up below the poverty line after divorce,
including many who were middle class while they were married.91
Divorce is a key reason many women end up on welfare.92  For many
women, the most effective way to get off welfare is to remarry.
Those who decry compulsory heterosexuality have very good
reasons to endorse an agenda designed to decrease the economic
pressures on mothers to sustain relationships with men.  This is not to
deny that many such relationships are positive; but if they are, they
will flourish without making heterosexuality compulsory.  Mothers
will no longer have to “choose” not to leave violent partners because
they cannot support themselves and their children unless they stay;
mothers will not have to stay with partners who humiliate them, or
who fail to make equal household contributions, because of a lack of
economic alternatives.  Changing the economics of heterosexuality
would also mean fewer children whose life chances are sullied when
their fathers walk away with the ideal-worker wage upon divorce, and
choose to disinvest in their first families in favor of founding a new
family.93  All these patterns are commonplace. All reflect patterns
                                                                
89. For power studies, see generally ROBERT O. BLOOD & DONALD M. WOLFE,
HUSBANDS AND WIVES:  THE DYNAMICS OF MARRIED LIVING (1960); Paula England &
Barbara Stanek Kilbourne, Markets, Marriages, and Other Mates:  The Problem of Power, in
BEYOND THE MARKET PLACE:  RETHINKING ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Roger Friedland &
A.F. Robertson eds., 1990); Phyllis N. Hallenbeck, An Analysis of Power Dynamic in
Marriage, 28 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY 200 (1966); Gerald W. McDonald, Family Power:
The Assessment of A Decade of Theory and Research, 1970-1979, 42 J. MARRIAGE & FAMILY
841 (1980).
90. See Jay D. Teachman & Kathleen M. Pasch, Financial Impact of Divorce on
Children and Their Families, in THE FUTURE OF CHILDREN:  CHILDREN AND DIVORCE 63
(1994).
91. See DEMIE KURZ, FOR R ICHER OR FOR POORER 3 (1995) (39% of divorced
mothers in poverty).
92. See NANCY E. DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES 74 (1997)
(asserting that family law fails to provide adequate support for divorced women).  See
Emily Jackson, Economic Justice in Divorce, 2 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 23, 42 (1995)
(stating that at least 50% of divorced women become dependent on welfare for some
period of time during the three years immediately following a marital separation).
93. See Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, Towards a Revitalization of Family Law, 69
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reconstructive feminism seeks to change.
Finally, it is important to remember that many lesbians and gays
are parents, and thus are affected by the same economic forces all
parents face, namely workplaces structured around an ideal worker
who takes no time off for childrearing.  A key point is that couples are
sometimes forced into traditional gender roles by the structure of
traditionally masculine jobs.  If the structure of the economy plays an
important role in reproducing traditional gender roles, gay as well as
straight couples will be affected.
My working hypothesis is that gay male couples with children are
more likely to conform to traditional gender roles than are lesbian
couples.  When, in the course of writing my co-authored casebook on
property, I interviewed a divorce lawyer who specializes in “gay
divorces,” he asserted that the dominant domestic ecology is common
among gay men raising children, with one taking the role of primary
caregiver while the other specializes in market work.94
In sharp contrast, a growing number of studies suggests that, while
the “Rozzie and Harriet” breadwinner/caregiver pattern exists in
lesbian couples, such couples are much more likely than
heterosexual couples to share both the caregiver and the
breadwinner roles.95  Why the difference between lesbian and gay
                                                                
TEX. L. REV. 245, 285 (1990) (discussing the possible reasons why fathers withdraw
support from their children and noting that some observers believe that a new
concept of fatherhood exists, “one in which parental responsibility lasts only as long
as the relationship with the child’s mother”).
94. See CURTIS J. BERGER & JOAN C. WILLIAMS, PROPERTY:  LAND OWNERSHIP AND
USE 391, 465, 487-88 (citing interview with Frederick C. Hertz, Esq., Mar. 1997).
95. See, e.g., Gillian A. Dunne, Opting into Motherhood:  Lesbians Blurring the
Boundaries and Transforming the Meaning of Parenthood and Kinship, 14 GENDER & SOC’Y
11 (2000) (studying eight households, finding strong egalitarian patterns; not
unusual to find the higher earner in a partnership reducing her hours of
employment to share care or become the main caregiver); Pauline I. Erera & Karen
Fredriksen, Lesbian Stepfamilies:  A Unique Family Structure, 80 FAMILIES IN SOC’Y 263
(1999) (noting that prior studies conflict on whether egalitarian ideology or
economics is more influential); Maureen Sullivan, Rozzie and Harriet? Gender and
Family Patterns of Lesbian Coparents, 10 GENDER & SOC’Y 747 (1996) (explaining that in
a study of thirty-four lesbian couples with children, twenty-nine couples had relatively
equal sharing arrangements, even if significant gaps in partners’ income levels
existed, while five couples assumed a “Rozzie and Harriet” pattern); see also Susan
Moller Okin, Sexual Orientation, Gender, and Families:  Dichotomizing Differences, 11
HYPATIA 42 (1996) (arguing lesbian egalitarianism; no recent studies cited); M.
Deborah Bialeschki & Kimberly D. Pearce, I Don’t Want a Lifestyle—I Want a Life:  The
Effect of Role Negotiations on the Leisure of Lesbian Mothers, 29 J. OF LEISURE RES. 113
(1997) (studying nine couples; strong egalitarian patterns reported).  The last
article, in my view, takes too much at face value statements that role negotiations
result in allocation of tasks based on personal interests; such language is often used
to justify extremely traditional caregiver/breadwinner role allocations, at least in
heterosexual couples. More study is needed to see whether this pattern holds for
lesbian couples.
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parents?  My hypothesis is that conventional genderings tend to occur
in families where one partner has an ideal-worker wage in a
traditionally masculine job—and that this happens more frequently
in gay than in lesbian couples.  To what extent is egalitarianism in
parenting affected by economics, by the gendered structure of
market work, and to what extent is it affected by ideology, by a
family’s professed beliefs in egalitarian gender ideals?  This is an
intriguing arena for future research.96
Does reconstructive feminism ignore single parents and other post-modern
families?
By focusing on the dominant family ecology of ideal-worker fathers
and primary-caregiver mothers, aren’t I ignoring single parents and
other post-modern families?
Far from it.  Indeed, the largest group of single parents—divorced
mothers with children—is directly at the center of my analysis.97
Nearly two out of every three single parents are divorced or
separated.98  The impoverishment of divorced mothers and their
children is a major issue:  as noted above nearly forty percent of
divorced mothers end up in poverty;99 the children of divorce are less
likely than other children to reach the educational level or class
status of their fathers.100
As noted above, I have proposed that the wages of both parents
should be viewed as jointly owned, rather than having the ideal-
worker wage seen as the sole personal property of the father.  This
proposal has important implications for the economy of gratitude101
in existing marriages, but its chief financial impact would be to
benefit divorced single mothers.
What of often-quoted statistics to the effect that few American
families are breadwinner/homemaker families?  Well known sources
                                                                
96. Compare Dunne, supra note 95, at 17 (finding lesbian couples influenced
more by egalitarian gender ideology than economics), with Erera & Fredriksen, supra
note 95, at 267 (noting that prior studies conflict with some studies finding lesbian
couples more egalitarian regardless of income differentials, while others find the low-
earning partner more involved in child-rearing, and the birth mother more involved
in child-rearing).
97. This emphasis is not readily apparent from this symposium.  It focuses on
restructuring market work because a prior symposium focused on my proposals
designed to deconstruct the ideal-worker norm in family entitlements.  See Joan
Williams, Do Wives Own Half?  The Intersection of Family Law and Property Law After
Wendt, 32 CONN. L. REV. 249 (1999) (Gallivan lecture, Apr. 9, 1999).
98. See NANCY DOWD, IN DEFENSE OF SINGLE PARENT FAMILIES 5 (1997).
99. See KURZ, supra note 91, at 3.
100. See Woodhouse, supra note 93, at 268-69 (discussing educational attainment
and class status of the children of divorced families).
101. See ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT:  WORKING PARENTS AND THE
REVOLUTION AT HOME 18 (1989).
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have placed this figure as low as three percent.102  In fact, twenty-nine
percent of families with children are of the breadwinner/housewife
type. The dominant family ecology is alive and well in America.
However, looking only at mothers at home full time
underestimates the persistence of the traditional pattern of providing
for children’s care by marginalizing their mothers.  Recall that two
out of three mothers aged twenty-five to forty-four with children
under eighteen work forty hours a week all year.103  In addition, for
fifty-nine percent of infants and forty-nine percent of toddlers,
parents are the primary child care arrangement.104  Only one in three
mothers with children under the age of three, and two in five
mothers with children under the age of six, work full time all year.105
Domesticity has not died; it has mutated.  Though most mothers
are no longer permanent housewives, their workforce participation
still is framed around their family work in ways that often impede
their ability to meet the masculinist ideal of a worker who is available
full time and for overtime “as needed” for forty years straight.
Though most mothers eventually return to work, few attain the
economic status they would have attained had they not taken time off
for childrearing.106 This is what produces the “family gap”
documented by Jane Waldfogel.107  This “family gap,” along with the
“wage gap,” helps explain why nearly eighty percent of those in
poverty in the United States are women and children.108
                                                                
102. This low statistic is misleading, however, because it refers only to American
families with two children.  Rather, 16.3% of all American families consist of this
arrangement.  A much larger percentage of two-parent families with children under
the age of eighteen (29%) are of the breadwinner-homemaker status.  Personal
communication with Katie Kirkland, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics
(July 20, 2000) (faxed material on file with author).
103. See UNBENDING GENDER, supra note 3, at 2; see also INSTITUTE FOR WOMEN’S
POLICY RESEARCH, LOOKING TOWARDS THE WORKPLACE OF THE 21ST CENTURY—CLOSING
THE POLICY GAP FOR WOMEN 14-20 (1996) (breadwinner fathers and homemaker
mothers comprise 20% of families with children).
104. See Network Memo, supra note 47, at 4 (citing NCCS, supra note 50, tbl. 2.16).
105. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, REPORT ON THE
AMERICAN WORKPLACE 1999 at 115, tbl. 3-8 (1999); BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S.
DEP’T OF LABOR, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY MARCH SUPPLEMENT (1999).
106. See Jane Waldfogel, The Effect of Children on Women’s Wages, 62 AM. SOC. REV.
209, 216 (1997); see also Rebecca Abrams, Why a Second Child Spells Ruin, NEW
STATESMAN, Feb. 28, 2000, at 15-16 (describing a study finding that the mother gap in
wages is more severe after a second child); Sylvia Ann Hewlett, Have a Child and
Experience the Wage Gap, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2000, at A23 (reporting on a Rand
Corporation study showing a woman’s lifetime earnings decreased by 13% after a
first child and 19% after a second child).
107. See Jane Waldfogel, supra note 106, at 216; see also Abrams, supra note 106, at
15-16 (describing a study finding that the gap in wages is more severe after a second
child).
108. See Joan Williams, Notes of a Jewish-Episcopalian:  Gender as a Language of Class,
Religion as a Dialect of Liberalism, in DEBATING DEMOCRACY’S DISCONTENTS (Anita Allen
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The central precept of domesticity continues.  We have preserved
the system of providing for children’s care by marginalizing their
mothers.  Single as well as married mothers are affected.  As
mentioned above, single mothers are almost as reluctant as married
ones to work substantial overtime in an economy where the best jobs
often require overtime work.  This pattern reflects the fact that, in
most divorced couples, the father continues to be the ideal worker,
still supported by a flow of family work from his ex-wife.
Gender roles in most divorced families are extraordinarily
traditional.109  The most common arrangement is for the mother to
have custody while the father has visitation.  Child care continues to
be treated as the responsibility of the mother, as it typically was
during the marriage:  to quote Karen Czapanskiy, the mother is
treated as a draftee, while the father is treated as a volunteer.110
Among never-married couples, gender roles with respect to
childrearing are often equally traditional.  Although many never-
married fathers help the mothers of their children with occasional
gifts and child care, most never-married fathers are involved very little
in day-to-day child-rearing.111
In conclusion, scholars who focus on family form tend to notice
how much has changed.  A lot has:  the hegemony of the
breadwinner/housewife has been replaced by a diversity of family
types.  Yet when the focus is on gender roles rather than family form,
what emerges most clearly are the patterns of continuity.  Most
divorced mothers continue as primary caregivers, with fathers “just
visiting.” Never-married fathers often play little role in their
children’s lives.  And most married fathers continue to be seen as
breadwinners, even when both parents are in the labor force.112
                                                                
& Milton Regan eds., 1998) (citing 80% figure).
109. See SUSAN STEWART, NONRESIDENT MOTHERS’ AND FATHERS’ SOCIAL CONTACT
WITH CHILDREN 894 (1999) (noting that “[s]tudies using nationally representative
data consistently find that father involvement with nonresident children is extremely
low”).
110. See Karen Czapanskiy, Volunteers and Draftees:  The Struggle for Parental Equality,
38 UCLA L. REV. 1415, 1415-16 (1991).  See generally Karen Czapanskiy,
Interdependencies, Families and Children, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 957 (1999)
(reconceptualizing family law to make central the dependence of the child on the
caretakers and the interdependence of children’s caretakers on society and vice
versa).
111. See Dowd, supra note 92, at 50 (noting the small number of “never-married
custodial fathers who actively nurture their children”); see also KATHRYN EDIN & LAURA
LEIN, MAKING ENDS MEET:  HOW SINGLE MOTHERS SURVIVE WELFARE AND LOW-WAGE
WORK 163 (1997) (describing in-kind assistance by absent fathers).
112. See JEAN POTUCKEK, WHO SUPPORTS THE FAMILY?  GENDER AND BREADWINNING IN
DUAL-EARNER MARRIAGES 188 (1997) (confirming “the finding that employed wives
are not necessarily regarded as family breadwinners”).
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The important point is that an analysis of family form is logically
independent of an analysis of gender roles.  A crucially important
message is that our current definition of the ideal worker has the
harshest implications for single mothers.  Needless to say, when
mothers parent alone they are not supported by a flow of family work
from a wife.
Domesticity in drag:  why not just get over it?
Why would we want to work within domesticity, rather than simply
leaving it behind?  It always surprises me when people still ask this
question, for I see domesticity as so pervasive that our chances of “just
getting over it” are minimal.  Most people (including many feminists)
still believe that women share an ethic of care, a classic expression of
the ideology of domesticity.  Two-thirds of Americans believe that it is
better for everyone if mothers stay home with the children.113  And
two-thirds of mothers still do not work forty hours per week all year
during the key years of child rearing.114
Domesticity has proved remarkably unbending:  it is so powerful an
influence on our daily lives that we cannot simply wish it away.  Its
hold stems from the way it intermixes gender (and class and race)
oppression with our most cherished goals for our children and
ourselves.
Any employed mother who has felt torn between home and work,
that she is serving many masters and none well, is feeling
domesticity’s clash between the ideal-worker norm and the norm of
parental care.  Any mother who has quit work, because of a sense that
otherwise she could not do right by her children, has had her life
determined by domesticity’s mandate that mothers “should have all
the time in the world to give.”115  Any woman who is on a “mommy
track” because she could not keep up with the pace required of ideal
workers and still be a responsible parent, has had seen her career
goals crushed under the weight of domesticity’s definition of the
ideal worker.  Any woman who is childless because her career path
required such intense commitment that she suddenly awoke and
found herself forty, with her chances to have children dwindling, has
                                                                
113. See Richard Morin & Megan Rosenfeld, With More Equity, More Sweat; Poll
Shows Sexes Agree on Pros and Cons of New Roles, WASH. POST, Mar. 22, 1998, at A1
(recognizing the changing roles of women in society).
114. See Ureta Census Data, supra note 16 (1995 data).
115. See DEBORAH FALLOWS, A MOTHER’S WORK 13 (1985) (lamenting the fact that
for the author, as a working mother, “rushing was becoming the norm,” which made
it difficult to spend uninterrupted time with her child); see also UNBENDING GENDER,
supra note 3, at 30-37 (stating that it is still a widely-accepted notion that mothers
“should have all the time in the world” to give to their children).
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had a different, but equally painful, encounter with domesticity.116
Any woman who is childfree, and is looked at askance as unwomanly
and selfish, faces dignitary affronts that stem from domesticity’s
insistence that true womanhood is defined by motherhood.117
Domesticity shapes men’s lives as well as women’s.  Any house-
husband who has been belittled for his failure to be a “real man” has
felt the discipline of domesticity.  Any father who feels caught
between the demands of his wife for household equality and the
demands of his boss to work 24/7 is caught between domesticity’s
ideal-worker norm and its norm of parental care.  Any nonfather who
has been treated as less of a man because he lacks the expected
accoutrements of manhood—a wife and children—feels the pressure
of the provider role enshrined by domesticity. Men from
subordinated groups who feel the sting of their inability to be
providers are experiencing domesticity’s role in maintaining class
and racial hierarchies among men.
Domesticity is so pervasive that the only realistic alternative is to use
its momentum against itself in the manner of a judo master, to flip
and bend it into new configurations.  Judith Butler’s notion of drag
as a political strategy118 is most powerful in this context when
combined with Pierre Bourdieu’s habitus.119  The habitus helps us
understand the way gender operates as a force field that pulls men
into the provider role and women into traditions of selfless
motherhood.  This force field derives both from objective structures
such as workplace norms and cultures and our system for delivering
child services through moms in cars, and from internalized structures
such as our aspirations to be a “good mother” who selflessly subsumes
her own goals to her family’s needs, and our (typically unconscious)
sense of what men need in order to attain dignity and self
fulfillment.120
                                                                
116. See ELINOR BURKETT, THE BABY BOON 55 (2000) (relating the story of female
journalist who was on a demanding career path, so intense that “without realizing
what I was doing to myself until it was too late, I forfeited the chance to have
children”).
117. Id. at 183 (discussing the idea that women without children have always been
considered “openly suspect” in the United States and throughout the world).
118. See JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 139
(1990) (describing the body as “a variable boundary, surface whose permeability is
politically regulated”).
119. Two sources especially helpful in providing background on habitus are
PIERRE BOURDIEU, THE LOGIC OF PRACTICE 26-56 (1980); P IERRE BOURDIEU,
DISTINCTION:  A SOCIAL CRITIQUE OF THE JUDGEMENT OF TASTE 169-225 (trans. Richard
Nice 1984) [hereinafter DISTINCTION].
120. Cf. D ISTINCTION, supra note 119, at 190-92 (a man’s dignity requires large
quantities of suitable food and drink that he can consume in a manner befitting his
masculinity).
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Domesticity defines the habitus that shapes our work and family
lives.  The economics of gender stem from our dreams for our
children, in a culture that genders both market work and family work
and insistently ignores the public interest at stake in the vital task of
raising the next generation.  The reproduction of traditional
genderings is overdetermined in an environment where so many
factors—both material and ideological—serve to anchor domesticity’s
preferred gender performances securely in place.
If Bourdieu helps answer one of the central puzzles for any gender
theorist today—why gender has proved so unbending—Butler helps
to define the political strategies that will be most effective in gender
bending, i.e. in changing existing hegemonic and subordinated
genderings into new, more promising norms and institutions forged
from old materials.121  Butler’s message begins from an important
insight about tradition.  The structure of our desire, she recognizes, is
built on the frame of traditional genderings.  That is why traditional
gender displays, performances, and rituals have such a hold on our
sexual lives.  Similarly, I have argued, our dreams for family life are
forged on the anvil of institutions, aspirations, and personalities
derived from domesticity.  That is why tradition continues to set the
mold for our work and family lives.
Given the role of tradition in shaping our dreams for human
connection (both sexual and familial), the only effective strategy is to
enact the gendered displays, performances, aspirations, and
personalities that constitute us in ways that transmute their
traditional meanings.  Butler helps explain why the interventions we
intend to be subversive will, inevitably, also have retrograde effects
(to quote Martha Ertman’s apt formulation).122  Butler’s importance
as a political strategist lies in her insight that the strategies that
present our best hopes for liberation also, simultaneously, reinscribe
the traditions we seek to change.  She reminds us that, when our goal
is to build new masculinities and femininities, we will inevitably
preserve large chunks of the old ones.  In the process of setting
priorities and finding a plausible balance between reinvention and
comprehensibility, we will inevitably reproduce parts of those same
traditions we seek to escape.
Domesticity in drag is the only possibility for a pragmatic program
designed to meet women where they are and to take them to the next
step.  This does not mean that visionary feminism is unimportant.  It
                                                                
121. Two sources especially helpful in presenting Butler’s theories are JUDITH
BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE (1990) and JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER (1993).
122. Conversations with Martha Ertman (Feb.-May 2000).
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is.  But we need to avoid gender wars between feminists committed to
opening up new conceptual space in the “épanter les bourgeois”
tradition of the avant guard, and those in the pragmatist tradition
whose goal is to articulate plausible-sounding arguments for goals
that push the envelope but are potentially implementable under
current conditions.  These two different projects are mutually
reinforcing, if only because what is not practical today may become
practical tomorrow.  It would be foolhardy to set our sights too low.
But it would also be rash to set goals so high that we can achieve
nothing in the short run.  We need to remember that the percentage
of American women who self-identify as feminists is small, and has
actually fallen in recent years, from thirty-four percent in 1989 to
twenty-eight percent in 1998.123  Many different people, with many
different priorities, are working to transmute our gender traditions,
using the only raw materials available—other elements of our gender
inheritance.  This process is more like rebuilding our houseboat as it
rocks in high seas, than like rebuilding a recreational sailboat on dry
land.  We can’t deconstruct too much at once even if we wanted to.
The risk is that we will sink like a stone.
We need to remember that feminists are always making difficult
trade-offs in order to balance moral entrepreneurship with our need
to function day to day in a world where our economy and our
personalities are gendered all the way down.124 Only by
acknowledging our own gendered compromises will be capable of
accepting each other’s.  This is a crucial step towards effective and
humane coalition.
                                                                
123. See Time/CNN Poll, TIME, June 29, 1998, at 58.
124. See Richard Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1637, 1642 (1998).
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APPENDIX
This table was generated just before this issue went to press; many
thanks to Liana Sayer of the Center on Population, Gender & Social
Inequality, Department of Sociology at the University of Maryland for
generating it.  It is directly relevant to two issues discussed in the
conference and the Afterword.
First, a bit of background.  The table uses education as a proxy for
class, which is a common approach.  All the data are for mothers
aged 25—44:  the key years of career advancement.  During those
crucial years:
The common claim that “only privileged women stay home” is
inaccurate.  This table confirms prior data that, in fact, poor and
working-class mothers are much more likely to be out of the labor force than are
more affluent ones.  Thus, 43% of poor and 23% of working-class
mothers are out of the labor force, whereas only 19% of more
privileged mothers are.  (Note that “welfare reform” appears not to
have changed the historical pattern:  how are these poor mothers
feeding their children, given the low rate of marriage among the
poor?)
A second equally common claim, also inaccurate, is that only
privileged mothers work part-time.  In fact, one out of three working-class
mothers works part-time.  The proportion of poor mothers working part-
time is only slightly lower—28%.  These data appear to confirm that
proportional pay, benefits and advancement would significantly
improve the lives of many nonprivileged women in two ways.  It would
end the artificially depressed compensation rates and lack of
advancement of part-time workers, which would help mothers
currently working part-time.  It would also make it easier for mothers
to join the labor force, by opening up reduced hours schedules for
women (and men) who have to rely on family members for day care.
(It would also, as noted in the text, make it far easier for “tag-team”
families; the AFL-CIO’s Ask A Working Woman survey found that 51%
of married women with children work a different shift from their
husband.)125
                                                                
125. See AFL-CIO, Ask a Working Woman Survey, at http://www.aflcio.org/women/
survey1.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2001).
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Table 1.  Work Hours by Educational Attainment, Mothers Age 25 to 44, 1999
Hours Last Year
Less Than
High School
High School
Diploma Some College
College
Graduate
No weekly work
hours 43% 23% 19% 19%
34 or less weekly
work hours 28% 33% 33% 36%
35 to 39 weekly
work hours 4% 5% 5% 4%
40 to 49 weekly
work hours 23% 34% 37% 33%
50 plus weekly
work hours 2% 4% 5% 8%
Hours Last Week
No weekly work
hours 52% 33% 30% 28%
34 or less work
hours 17% 21% 23% 24%
35 to 39 work
hours 5% 7% 8% 6%
40 to 49 work
hours 23% 33% 33% 32%
50 plus work
hours 3% 6% 6% 10%
N 1912 4509 4115 3077
Source:  March 1999 Current Population Survey, All Mothers age 25 to 44126
                                                                
126. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS & BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION
SURVEY, 1999 ANNUAL DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY, MARCH SUPPLEMENT (1999), available at
http://www.bls.census.gov/cps/ads/1999/sdata.htm.
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Table 2.  Work Hours by Educational Attainment, Mothers Age 25 to 44, 1999
Overlapping Definition; Columns do not add to 100%
Hours Last Year
Less Than
High School
High School
Diploma Some College
College
Graduate
No weekly work
hours 43% 23% 19% 19%
34 or less weekly
work hours 13% 21% 22% 23%
39 or less weekly
work hours 19% 27% 29% 29%
49 or less weekly
work hours 54% 71% 75% 71%
Hours Last Week
No weekly work
hours 52% 33% 30% 28%
34 or less work
hours 17% 21% 23% 24%
39 or less work
hours 22% 28% 31% 30%
49 or less work
hours 45% 61% 64% 63%
N 1912 4509 4115 3077
Source:  March 1999 Current Population Survey, All Mothers age 25 to 44127
                                                                
127. Id.
